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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James Edwin Wolfe appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Wolfe contends the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Deputy Nelson was on patrol and assisting another officer with a traffic
stop when he observed a PT Cruiser following dangerously close to a
motorhome. (R., p.19.) Based on his observations, Deputy Nelson initiated a
traffic stop on the PT Cruiser. (R., p.19.) When the PT Cruiser pulled over, the
motorhome it was following also pulled over. (R., p.19.)
While Deputy Nelson was making contact with the driver of the PT
Cruiser, later identified as Joseph Schabow, Jr. (“Joseph”), the driver of the
motorhome, later identified as Joseph Schabow, Sr. (“Mr. Schabow”), got out
and started walking toward Deputy Nelson.

(R., p.19.)

Deputy Nelson

responded by telling Mr. Schabow: “Hey man, just wait in your car for me, all
right?

Appreciate it.”

(Exhibit 1, 1:12-1:15.)

Deputy Nelson then asked if

Joseph was traveling “with this guy,” and Joseph confirmed that his dad was
driving the motorhome, his cousin (Wolfe) was a passenger, and explained they
were traveling to North Dakota for work. (Exhibit 1, 1:15 – 1:35, 2:40 – 2:46.)
Deputy Nelson advised Joseph he stopped him because he was traveling too
close to the motorhome and advised Joseph to “give himself a little more
distance so he can see you.” (Exhibit 1, 1:35 – 2:00.)
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After obtaining Joseph’s driver’s license, registration, and insurance,
Deputy Nelson made contact with the driver of the motorhome, Mr. Schabow,
and told Mr. Schabow he stopped his son and explained the reason for the stop.
(R., p.19; Exhibit 1, 2:00 – 4:18.) Mr. Schabow indicated he stopped because
that was his son. (Exhibit 1, 4:01 – 4:03.)
Deputy Nelson asked Mr. Schabow: “Do you have a driver’s license, sir?
(Exhibit 1, 4:26 – 4:29.) Deputy Nelson also commented, “Understand, I didn’t
stop you, but since you stopped,” at which point Mr. Schabow reiterated he
pulled over because his son was stopped. (Exhibit 1, 4:50 – 5:00.) Deputy
Nelson asked Mr. Schabow if anyone else was in the motorhome, and Mr.
Schabow said his nephew was “back there.” (Exhibit 1, 4:40 – 4:48.)
Deputy Nelson then had a brief conversation with Mr. Schabow about Mr.
Schabow’s trip to North Dakota and asked, “Do you have registration for the
vehicle, if you don’t mind me looking at it, sir?” (Exhibit 1, 5:00 – 5:42.) Mr.
Schabow apparently could not locate the paperwork, so he asked Deputy Nelson
to ask Joseph if he knew where it was. (Exhibit 1, 6:44 – 6:48.) Deputy Nelson
agreed to do so and walked back to the PT Cruiser and asked Joseph if he knew
where to find the paperwork.

(Exhibit 1, 6:48 – 7:12.)

Joseph could not

immediately answer the question, so Deputy Nelson told him to “hang tight and
think about it,” while Deputy Nelson returned to his patrol car to talk to
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two deputies who had arrived on scene.1 (Exhibit 1, 7:12 – 8:35.) While Deputy
Nelson was talking with the other deputies, Mr. Schabow again got out of the
motorhome with paperwork and started walking toward them; Deputy Nelson
apparently asked Mr. Schabow to return to the motorhome at that time. (Exhibit
1, 7:50 – 7:52; R., p.67.)
During his conversation with the other deputies, Deputy Nelson explained
what had transpired and asked one deputy to issue Joseph “a warning ticket for
following too close” and to “verify” Mr. Schabow’s driving status and to make sure
“that he did not have any warrants.” (R., pp.67, 88; see also p.20.) Deputy
Nelson asked the other assist deputy to contact Mr. Schabow and ask him to
remain in the motorhome.

(R., pp.67, 88.)

After making contact with Mr.

Schabow, the assist deputy “returned from the motorhome with paperwork.” (R.,
pp.67, 88.)
While the warning ticket for Joseph was being written, and Mr. Schabow’s
status was being checked, Deputy Nelson deployed his drug dog, Pogo, to
“conduct[ ] a free air sniff around the motorhome.” (R., pp.67-68, 88.) Pogo
“positively indicated to the odor of a controlled substance emitting from the
motorhome,” after which Mr. Schabow and Wolfe were “removed from the
motorhome and pat searched with negative results.” (R., p.68.) A subsequent

1

Although Deputy Nelson can be seen on the video recording talking to the other
deputies, there is no audio; in fact, the audio does not begin again until after both
Mr. Schabow and Wolfe exited the motorhome, at which time Deputy Nelson can
be heard again explaining to Mr. Schabow the reason he stopped Joseph and
notifying Mr. Schabow that his drug dog alerted on the motorhome. (Exhibit 1,
7:12 – 15:00.) During this conversation, Mr. Schabow agreed he had “no
problem” giving Deputy Nelson his driver’s license. (Exhibit 1, 14:40 – 14:51.)
3

search of the motorhome revealed “several illegal substances,” including
marijuana and methamphetamine.

(R., p.68.)

The deputies also found

2
paraphernalia. (R., p.68.) After being read Miranda warnings, Wolfe indicated

“all of the drugs and drug paraphernalia” belonged to him and admitted he “uses
up to ten times a day, and that he last used that morning.” (R., p.68.)
The state charged Wolfe with possession of methamphetamine and
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.53-54.) Wolfe filed a motion to suppress,
asserting he was unlawfully detained, the motorhome in which he was travelling
was unlawfully searched, and his “custodial interrogation . . . was invalid as ‘fruit
of the poisonous tree.’” (R., pp.61-62, 76.) Wolfe elected not to proceed to an
evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress, but instead submitted the officer’s
3
recording (Exhibit 1) and “submit[ted]” on the parties’ briefing. (10/2/2014 Tr.,

p.4, Ls.16-22.) The parties also stipulated (1) “that the officer took the driver’s
driver’s license away from him and never actually gave it back” because the
driver was arrested, and (2) “there was no consent to the search.” (10/2/2014
Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.2.) After the court reviewed the recording, it heard oral
argument, after which it denied Wolfe’s motion to suppress.

(See generally

10/20/2014 Tr.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wolfe entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance, and the state dismissed the paraphernalia
charge; Wolfe reserved the right to challenge the denial of his suppression
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3

Wolfe also agreed that the court only needed to review the first 15 minutes of
the video. (10/2/2014 Tr., p.6, Ls.7-14.)
4

motion. (See generally 10/23/2014 Tr.; R., p.130.) The district court imposed a
unified six-year sentence, with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence
and placed Wolfe on probation. (R., pp.131-135.) Wolfe filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp.139-140.)
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ISSUES
Wolfe states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wolfe’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Wolfe failed to show error in the district court’s determination that the
initial encounter between the officer and the occupants of the motorhome in
which Wolfe was a passenger was consensual and was never illegal?
2.
Has Wolfe failed to show any error in the district court’s determination that
the search of the motorhome was lawful pursuant to the automobile exception
given the positive alert by a drug dog?
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ARGUMENT
Wolfe Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Wolfe asserts the district court erred in denying his suppression motion.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-26.) Specifically, Wolfe argues that he was unlawfully
seized when Mr. Schabow, the driver of the motorhome in which he was
travelling, voluntarily pulled over when Deputy Nelson conducted a traffic stop on
Mr. Schabow’s son. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-18.) Wolfe further argues that,
even if not seized at that point, the search of the motorhome was unlawful
because, he claims, the search was not supported by probable cause despite
the fact that a drug dog alerted on the motorhome. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.18-26.)
Application of the law to the evidence submitted in support of Wolfe’s
suppression motion shows Wolfe’s arguments fail.
The district court correctly concluded that the initial contact with the
occupants of the motorhome was consensual and never evolved into an unlawful
seizure.

With respect to the district court’s probable cause determination in

relation to the search of the motorhome, the district court correctly concluded
that the positive alert by the drug dog provided probable cause to support the
search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards
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have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,
485-486, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d
306, 309 (2004). However, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984
P.2d 703, 706 (1999).
C.

Wolfe Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Determination
That The Initial Encounter Was Consensual And Never Evolved Into An
Unlawful Detention
When addressing a claim, like Wolfe’s, that the district court erred in

denying a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court must first “decide
whether the initial encounter was lawful.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843,
103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). “An encounter between a law enforcement officer
and a citizen does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is
nonconsensual.”

Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486, 211 P.3d at 95 (citations

omitted). To constitute a seizure, the officer must, “by means of physical force or
show of authority,” in some way restrain an individual’s liberty. Id. This “requires
words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement officer that would convey to a
reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her
movement.”

Id. (citations omitted).

“[A] request for identification or mere

questioning is not enough, by itself[,] to constitute a seizure.” State v. Landreth,
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139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2004) (citations omitted). “This is so
because the person approached need not answer any question put to him and
may decline to listen to the questions at all and go about his business.” State v.
Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-498 (1983)). The relevant inquiry is whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would feel free to
disregard the law enforcement officer”; if so, “then the encounter is consensual.”
Id.
In denying Wolfe’s suppression motion, the district court made the
following factual findings:
The evidence that the Court believes has been, or has in the
record before it is that the motorhome and the -- what I’m gonna
call the PT Cruiser vehicle were both -- eventually came to a stop
on the side of Interstate 90 after the law enforcement involved had
indicated by lights for the vehicle, the PT Cruiser, to pull over.
The motor vehicle -- the motorhome was parked on the side
of the busy freeway ahead of the PT Cruiser, and the video of this
stop, or the DVD of this stop showed that the law enforcement
officer approached the passenger side of the PT Cruiser and
determined from the driver of that vehicle that that driver was going
to North Dakota.
And that during that conversation, the driver -- not the
defendant, Mr. Wolfe, but the driver of the motorhome stepped out
of the motorhome as if to walk back toward the location of the
officer while talking to the driver of the PT Cruiser. The officer then
orally, verbally indicated for the driver to just wait there, not to come
back to his location, to not approach and become part of that
conversation.
The driver of the PT Cruiser indicated that the man in the
motorhome was that driver’s father, that they were on their way to
go to North Dakota for jobs, and the driver of the PT Cruiser was
advised that he’d been stopped for following the motorhome in a
manner that was too close for traffic safety. And he obtained from
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that driver the driver’s license, registration, proof of insurance of the
PT Cruiser driver.
The law enforcement officer then approached the passenger
side of the motorhome and did make an audible statement, for the
record, to the effect of that the officer had not stopped the
motorhome, but since the motorhome stopped on its own, words to
that effect, and someone in the motorhome indicated, yeah, I saw
you pull him over, to the Court indicating that the motorhome was
pulled over voluntarily and consensually because the driver or
someone in the motorhome saw that the PT Cruiser had been
pulled over, and apparently those vehicles were traveling together
in tandem.
It appears that the driver’s license of the driver of the
motorhome was obtained by law enforcement, and during a further
discussion, the passenger of the motorhome stepped out of the
motorhome again and began to walk back towards the law
enforcement officer who indicated to him, Just wait in the vehicle,
please, or to stay in the vehicle.
The Court agrees with the arguments, or the factual
submissions of the parties, that while the driver’s license and the
proof of insurance and the registration and checks on warrants
were being done by central dispatch, a dog was, I think the word is
“applied to” or at least run around the motorhome and apparently
alerted.
(10/20/2014 Tr., p.10, L.8 – p.12, L.12.)
Based on the foregoing factual findings, the district court concluded “that
the stopping of the motorhome was voluntary by the motorhome driver” such that
there was a “consensual encounter between the occupants of the motorhome
and the law enforcement officer.” (10/20/2014 Tr., p.12, Ls.21-25.) The district
court reasoned:
The Court does not find the words of the law enforcement
officer, either to the driver or to Mr. Wolfe, when both of those -- at
different times both of those persons attempted to walk back to the
location of the law enforcement officer when he was either
speaking to the driver of the PT Cruiser or speaking to other
officers.
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What I’m trying to say is, the words “Wait in your vehicle” or
“Don’t come back here,” the Court deems to be directions about
what those individuals could do at that scene, but not prohibitions
from those individuals driving off.
It would be akin to, as the Court saw it, to a bystander or an
onlooker, if that’s even a word, someone watching an event coming
up to an incident where police were interacting with citizens, and if
that person who walks up on that incident wants to join in the
conversation, a law enforcement officer would be perfectly
reasonable to say, Don’t come join this conversation, stay back,
don’t come join us.
That doesn’t mean that person’s not free to go walking along
their way. It means that they can stay or they can go as they
choose. They just can’t come join in the conversation, and that’s
how the Court deems the directions to the motorhome driver and
the passenger of the motorhome.
(10/20/2014 Tr., p.13, L.1 – p.14, L.1.)
The district court further found there was “no detention of Mr. Wolfe as the
passenger in the motorhome until such time that, purportedly, the dog alerted on
that motorhome,” which provided “reasonable suspicion, or even probable cause
to detain those occupants further and to ultimately arrest them.” (10/20/2014 Tr.,
p.14, Ls.2-9.) And, because Wolfe was not unlawfully detained, his statements
were not subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree. (10/20/2014 Tr.,
p.14, Ls.10-14.)
Wolfe contends that, contrary to the district court’s determination, “he was
seized when Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow to wait for [him] in the motorhome
and Mr. Schabow complied.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)

In support of this

contention, Wolfe correctly notes that “[a] seizure occurs by submission to a
show of authority where an officer orders a citizen to wait for the officer at a
particular place, and the citizen complies with the order.”
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(Appellant’s Brief,

p.12.) Wolfe argues this standard was satisfied in this case when Deputy Nelson
supposedly “ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome
without telling Mr. Schabow he was free to leave.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)
According to Wolfe, “a reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s position would have
believed he was not free to leave.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.) Wolfe’s argument
ignores the circumstances which gave rise to the encounter between Deputy
Nelson and Mr. Schabow in the first instance.
Mr. Schabow voluntarily stopped his motorhome in front of the PT Cruiser
driven by his son, Joseph, when Deputy Nelson conducted a traffic stop on the
PT Cruiser.

Mr. Schabow then voluntarily got out of his motorhome and

approached Deputy Nelson as Deputy Nelson was talking to Joseph.

Mr.

Schabow’s behavior evidenced his desire to talk to Deputy Nelson or otherwise
become involved in Deputy Nelson’s detention of Joseph.

That Deputy

responded to Mr. Schabow’s action by stating: “Just wait in your car for me.
Appreciate it.” (Exhibit 1, 1:12 - 1:15), did not convert what Mr. Schabow initiated
as a voluntary encounter into a detention by Deputy Nelson. Further, the fact
that Deputy Nelson did not also tell Mr. Schabow that he “was free to leave” did
not change the nature of the encounter, as Wolfe suggests. (Appellant’s Brief,
p.13.) Since Deputy Nelson did not detain Mr. Schabow in the first place, he was
not required to tell Mr. Schabow he was free to leave; Mr. Schabow was free to
not stop, just as he was free to leave. Moreover, it strains credulity to contend
that Mr. Schabow would have left only if Deputy Nelson told him he could given
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that it is apparent from the record that he stopped because his son was pulled
over and intended to stay for that reason because they were traveling together.
The district court correctly rejected Wolfe’s argument that he was
unlawfully detained when Mr. Schabow voluntarily stopped to wait for his son
when Deputy Nelson pulled his son over. Wolfe has failed to show otherwise.
Wolfe next “asserts the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was
unreasonable because it came after Deputy Nelson’s illegal seizure” of the
occupants of the motorhome. (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.) Because this argument
is predicated on the incorrect assertion that Wolfe was seized when Mr.
Schabow voluntarily stopped when his son was pulled over, it fails. To the extent
Wolfe is claiming that the otherwise consensual encounter became a seizure
when Mr. Schabow gave Deputy Nelson his driver’s license, this claim also fails.
Mr. Schabow voluntarily gave Deputy Nelson his driver’s license when
Deputy Nelson asked for it knowing he was not required to do so because
Deputy Nelson told him he was not the subject of the traffic stop. Mr. Schabow’s
consensual act did not transform the encounter into a seizure.

See United

States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement
officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose
questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage—
provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.”); INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (“While most citizens will respond to a police request,
the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to
respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.”); State v.
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Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004) (quotations, citation, and
brackets omitted) (“Interrogating a person concerning his identification or
requesting identification does not, without more, constitute a seizure.”).
Even if Deputy Nelson’s request to see Mr. Schabow’s license constituted
a seizure, the request did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 4 State v. Godwin,
121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992), is instructive. In Godwin, an Idaho State
Trooper conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Alicia Whitfield. 121
Idaho at 491, 826 P.2d at 452. As the trooper made contact with Whitfield,
“another vehicle, operated by Godwin, stopped on the highway approximately
100 yards ahead.” Id. While the trooper was talking to Whitfield, a Sheriff’s
deputy “happened to drive by and, upon seeing the situation, activated his rear
deck lights and pulled in behind Godwin’s vehicle.” Id. at 491-492, 826 P.2d at
452-453.

As the deputy exited his vehicle, the trooper advised him “that

Whitfield believed her driver’s license was in her purse which was in Godwin’s
vehicle.” Id. at 492, 826 P.2d at 453. While trying to locate Whitfield’s license,
the deputy also asked Godwin for his driver’s license, which he used to conduct

4

To the extent the district court erred in finding no seizure occurred until the dog
alerted on the motorhome, providing reasonable suspicion to detain the
motorhome’s occupants and probable cause to search, this Court may affirm on
any basis supported by the record. State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 346, 256
P.3d 750, 754 (2011); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v.
Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993) (“where an order of the
district court is correct but based upon an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm
upon the correct theory”); Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County
Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 2010) (“an
appellate court may affirm the district court’s decision if an alternative legal basis
supports it”).
14

“a driver’s license check”; dispatch reported Godwin’s license was suspended.
Id. A search incident to arrest revealed cocaine. Id.
Godwin moved to suppress, arguing he was unlawfully seized. Godwin,
121 Idaho at 492, 826 P.2d at 453.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that,

although a “limited seizure occurred when” the deputy “took Godwin’s license
and told him to remain in his car,” the seizure was reasonable under the
circumstances. Id. at 493, 826 P.2d at 454. This was so because the minimal
intrusion involved was outweighed by the substantial public interest in requesting
Godwin’s driver’s license under the circumstances. Id. at 494-495, 826 P.2d at
455-456. The Court in Godwin specifically recognized that “an officer should be
allowed to identify, with certainty, the person with whom he is dealing” in order to
“protect himself and other officers from danger, to accurately prepare any
required reports concerning his contact with the motorist, and to allow the officer
to adequately respond to allegations of illegal conduct or improper behavior.”
121 Idaho at 495, 826 P.2d at 456 (emphasis omitted). Additionally, the Court
noted there is a “valid public interest in permitting a police officer to run a record
check on a driver’s license under these circumstances,” and the “need to identify
the person with whom a police officer is dealing would logically extend to making
a correct identification and determining the validity and status of the driver’s
license upon which the identification is based.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
Godwin is factually analogous to this case, and the same legitimate
interests recognized by the Court in Godwin are present here.

Given Mr.

Schabow’s desire to stop and remain at the location of Joseph’s traffic stop, it
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was reasonable for Deputy Nelson, for his safety and for reporting purposes, to
correctly identify Mr. Schabow. Wolfe acknowledges the opinion in Godwin, but
claims the “similarities” between that case and this case are “superficial”
because, he argues, “the taking here did not come after a valid, lawful contact
with police.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.18.) As previously explained, this assertion is
contradicted by the record. This Court should, therefore, follow the principles
articulated in Godwin and reject Wolfe’s claim that Deputy Nelson’s conduct was
unreasonable.
Wolfe has failed to show any error in the district court’s determination that
Wolfe was never unlawfully seized.
D.

Wolfe Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Conclusion That
The Positive Drug Dog Alert Provided Probable Cause To Search The
Motorhome Pursuant To The Automobile Exception To The Warrant
Requirement
Wolfe argues that, even if he was not “illegally seized,” the “search of the

motorhome was illegal because probable cause to search the motorhome did not
exist.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.18.) More specifically, Wolfe contends the search
was unlawful because “the State offered no evidence that the drug dog [who
alerted on the motorhome] was certified or otherwise reliable,” and, therefore,
“probable cause did not exist for the search.”

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.18-19.)

Wolfe’s claim regarding the drug dog is not preserved and his probable cause
argument is contrary to law.
Wolfe did not request an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress.
Instead, Wolfe advised the court that he and the prosecutor “agreed” not to
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“hav[e] this big, drawn out factual hearing” and the parties decided to “submit the
DVD,” which was admitted as Exhibit 1, and “then submit that with [the parties’]
briefing and let the Court take it under advisement.” (10/2/2014 Tr., p.4, Ls.1622.) Wolfe’s briefing presented two issues: (1) “Whether the warrantless search
of the Wolfe vehicle [sic] lacked probable cause or was otherwise ‘fruit of the
poisonous tree’”; and (2) “Whether the custodial interrogation of Wolfe was
invalid was ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’”

(R., p.76.)

Nowhere in his

“Memorandum of Points and Authorities” in support of his motion to suppress did
Wolfe assert the drug dog was unreliable. (See generally R., pp.75-78.) Wolfe’s
motion was similarly silent on this point. (R., pp.61-62.) At the oral argument
held after the hearing at which Wolfe agreed to submit the suppression issues on
Deputy Nelson’s recording and the parties’ briefing, Wolfe argued:
Now, there’s something that has come up that I thought
about after we submitted this to you, and it wasn’t -- I wasn’t
trying to pull a quick one or something, but it’s a -- there’s no
evidence that the dog was a certified K-9. So the whole basis for
the probable cause, according to the State, is that the K-9 did a
sniff around the RV and that gave him probable cause to get
everybody out and search them, search the RV. So that’s -- that’s
kind of an afterthought there.
(10/20/2014 Tr., p.5, Ls.12 – 20 (emphasis added).)
The district court responded to Wolfe’s “afterthought” as follows:
Before I hear from the State, I think the issue of whether the dog
was certified in the discipline for which it’s used in terms of alerting
on suspected drugs is a completely new issue that would need to
be raised by a motion and briefing and notice to the Court and
notice to the other side to be ready for it, so it won’t be addressed
by the Court today.
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(10/201/2014 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-9.) Despite the invitation to move for suppression on
an additional basis, Wolfe did not do so, but instead elected to plead guilty and
reserve the right to raise the suppression issues he did assert on appeal. (See
10/20/2014 Tr., pp.15-16 (discussion after the court’s ruling at which Wolfe did
not express any intent to follow-up on the reliability of the drug dog).)
Nevertheless, on appeal, Wolfe contends “the district court should have
addressed the issue of the drug dog’s certification” because, he claims, it “was
not a new issue because the State had argued the drug dog’s alert provided
probable cause for the search of the motorhome.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.20.) In
particular, the state asserted in its written opposition to Wolfe’s motion to
suppress that the drug dog is a “well-trained, reliable, Idaho certified drug
detection dog.” (R., p.88 n.7, p.95.) What Wolfe fails to acknowledge is that the
state made this general assertion in response to the suppression issues he
raised, and before the suppression hearing at which the parties agreed to submit
Wolfe’s suppression claim for consideration on the DVD and the briefs.
(Compare R., pp.85-97 (state’s Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
to Suppress, filed September 19, 2014) with 10/2/2014 Tr.) If Wolfe wished to
challenge the reliability of the drug dog in response to the state’s memorandum
or, more properly, in his initial motion to suppress, he could have done so; he did
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not.5 See I.C.R. 47 (motion “shall state the grounds upon which the motion is
made”); see State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161-162, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169-1170
(Ct. App. 2000) (defendant has burden to present grounds for motion in the trial
court and may not raise alternative bases for suppression for the first time on
appeal). The district court did not abuse its discretion by advising Wolfe at the
oral argument that, if he wished to pursue his “afterthought” on the drug dog’s
reliability, he must raise the issue “by a motion and briefing and notice to the
Court and notice to the other side to be ready for it.” (10/20/2014 Tr., p.6, Ls.28.)
Further, even if Wolfe is correct in his assertion that the district court
should have addressed the drug dog’s certification when it ruled on Wolfe’s
6
motion to suppress, the only “evidence” before the court at that time was the

state’s assertion that the dog is a “well-trained, reliable, Idaho Certified drug
detection dog.” (R., p.95.) The district court’s finding that there was probable
cause to search the motorhome based on the dog’s positive alert (10/20/2014
5

If Wolfe is correct in his assertion that the state had an affirmative obligation to
present evidence of Pogo’s reliability simply because it asserted, in its brief, that
the dog alert provided probable cause, then Wolfe was also required to provide
evidence of his standing to challenge the search of his motorhome in addition to
his assertion, in his brief, that he “owns/lawfully possesses the RV” (R., p.76) as
it is his burden to establish standing regardless of whether it is challenged by the
state. State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 719, 132 P.3d 468, 476 (Ct. App. 2006)
(defendant has “the burden to show standing even if it has not been challenged
by the State”).
6

Having agreed to allow the district court to dispose of his motion to suppress
based on the DVD and the briefs, Wolfe cannot now contend that any findings
based on the DVD and briefs were improper. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,
___, 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015) (“The invited error doctrine precludes a criminal
defendant from ‘consciously’ inviting district court action and then successfully
claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal.”).
19

Tr., p.14, Ls.4-9),

was based on the only information before it and, to that

extent, the issue was decided. It is well-established that a positive alert by a
drug dog provides probable cause to search a vehicle pursuant to the automobile
exception.

See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); State v.

Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 875, 172 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Ct. App. 2007). Wolfe’s
claim that there was no probable cause because the state did not present
additional “evidence” on an un-raised issue at a non-existent evidentiary hearing
is absurd.

See Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013) (When “the

defendant has challenged the State’s case (by disputing the reliability of the dog
overall or of a particular alert), then the court should weigh the competing
evidence.”) (emphasis added).
Wolfe’s final argument is that “his incriminating statements should have
been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.25.)
Wolfe’s entire argument on this point is premised on the viability of his claims
that he was unlawfully detained and the motorhome was illegally searched.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.25-26.) For the reasons already stated, those claims fail.
As a result, Wolfe’s fruit of the poisonous tree argument necessarily fails.
The district court correctly denied Wolfe’s motion to suppress; Wolfe has
failed to show otherwise.

20

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Wolfe’s conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.
DATED this 24th day of March, 2016.
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of March, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

21

